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This research focuses on the possible lag relationship among exchange rates. The period 
considered (2000-2013) comprises the Financial Crisis and therefore it was divided into 
two distinct periods: before and during the crisis. Before the crisis, the returns of 
Sweden and the Euro Zone seem to have impact on the British, Korean and Australian 
ones. During the crisis, there is evidence of the Euro and Sterling Pound influence on 
the Australian and New Zealand Dollar. Interestingly, the Swedish Krona is significant, 
in both periods, for the Korean Won, leading to deepen their common “technological 
profile” or the significance of major companies of both countries on Sweden’s returns. 
Carry trade is also presented as a possible justification for the Australian Dollar’s 
importance. 












1.1) Research motivation: The role of exchange rates in the financial world comprises 
financial markets, business strategy or police-markers’ decisions. Regarding financial 
markets, Forex is traded over-the-counter, and its liquidity and low transaction costs are 
advantages compared to other asset classes, which justifies the utility of forecast 
models, or a particular variable, for exchange rates. The business strategy is also 
influenced by the value of currencies, namely in relative value of cash flows. Thus, the 
path of exchange rates is relevant in order to define operations, under a short-term 
perspective, or to define a strategy, under a long-term perspective1. Finally, policy-
makers are also interested in this topic since the results of its policies are influenced by 
the behaviour of exchange rates2.  
One of the main contributions for this research was the paper by Rapach, Strauss and 
Guofu (2013) regarding stock returns predictability. This innovative approach includes 
other countries’ lagged returns in the predictability regression of return, in order to 
identify causality, and the US stock returns are pointed out as having the leading role in 
most of other countries’ returns. Additionally, this model also includes dividend yield 
and interest rates to control for country risk. The significance of the US coefficient is 
supported by its relevant in financial system and by information frictions, which implies 
that US equity index captures the market sentiment earlier than the remaining indices.   
Considering the significant results obtained in the abovementioned research, as well as 
its economic intuition, the motivation of this research is to apply the same lead-lag 
approach to exchange rates. Even though exchange rates regressors are included in a 
                                                          
1 Regarding operations, the definition of delivery terms or currencies are examples of topics at which exchange rates’forecast can be 
useful, while the definition of markets to explore, in a longer time horizon, should take into account this variable.  
2 These are the cases of interest rates, in the perspective of Central Banks, or fiscal policy, in the case of government. 
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model, which considers other control variables, the purpose of this research is not to 
find a forecast model to fit returns behaviour accurately. The purpose is to find causality 
in variables, which might be included in sophisticated forecast models. 
1.2) Literature review: Meese and Rogoff (1983) studied the accuracy of structural 
models to forecast nominal exchange rates, which include money supply, short-term 
interest rate differentials, output gap, long-term inflation differentials and difference in 
cumulative trade balances between US and foreign countries. The results pointed a 
failure of structural models to outperform the random walk in out-of-sample, which was 
considered as the benchmark3. In the same way, Rossi (2013) summarized recent 
studies concerning exchange rates predictability, using also the random walk as 
benchmark. Some variables were identified as inefficient for this effect, such as 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP), while others, 
such as the Taylor Rule, the Net Foreign Assets4 or Commodity prices may provide 
some improvements (this concepts are detailed in note 1). However, the main problem 
of these predictors is the data frequency. Since most of these variables are directed to 
macroeconomic forecasts, with a long-term horizon, the time frequency is monthly or 
quarterly. According to the Research Motivation, and as will be deepened later on in 
Data Description, the purpose of this paper is to identify exchange rates, under in-
sample perspective, that have a leading role for the remaining exchange rates, with a 
focus on a financial perspective. 
Considering that the aforementioned literature is not useful for the purpose of the 
research, other alternatives were analysed, in order to complement the basis of the 
model, which is the use of the exchange rate as a predictor for the others. Chen and Ang 
                                                          
3 Both univariate time series and multivariate VAR where considered, using a frequency from one to twelve months. 
4 This indicator is used later on, in section 5 
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(2013) provided a study about the yield curve, which may have influence in pricing 
kernel5. Carry is the most typical predictor used to represent the yield curve, but other 
indicators are proposed. The intuition is that it can represent the agents’ perception, both 
investors and policy-makers, about long-term inflation and money policy targets. The 
model consists in cross-sectional predictability in a panel of currencies, and uses risk 
premium as the dependent variable. Term spread and level are presented as relevant 
predictors, where the results point to the conclusions that currencies with large changes 
in interest rate levels tend to appreciate (positive relation) and currencies with steep 
term spread tend to depreciate (negative relation). As occurs in Rapach, Strauss and 
Guofu’s (2013) model, these variables may control, in some way, the country’s risk.  
The literature about this type of causality is limited. The Safe Haven effect may be one 
of the conclusions from this research, as presented in Ranaldo and Söderlind (2007). In 
addition, Rapach, Strauss and Guofu (2013) identified causality in stocks, highlighting 
US as the main driver of the remaining returns. The main reason is the economic 
preponderance, so the conclusions from this analysis may follow the same idea, with the 
reference currencies in the world having predictive power for the remaining exchange 
rate returns. 
2) Data and variables  
2.1) Countries, time horizon and frequency: The research assumes an US investor’s 
perspective, as the reference in financial market, since the USD appreciation or 
depreciation has an immediate impact on the police markers’ decisions, companies’ 
activity or the overall financial market, so it is more intuitive to consider that prism.  
                                                          
5 Pricing Kernel reflects the factors that drives countries’ risk. 
5 
 
The countries or economic blocks considered for the research implies a detailed 
selection since, unlike to other assets’ analysis, the exchange rates present some 
idiosyncrasies that can pervert the final results. A relevant point in this analysis is 
addressed by Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks and Oomes (2004). On the one hand, these 
authors highlight the difference between fixed and float regimes. In the former, the 
variation in exchange rates may be a consequence of macroeconomic policies, so the 
value of the currency is not accurately captured, while in the case of float rates, the 
behavior is expected to be more linked to the true value. On the other hand, even though 
some countries may announce a certain regime (De Jure regime), it may not be verified 
in exchange rate behaviour. Hence, the Natural Classification is proposed to classify the 
De Facto regimes6, and the countries selected, and respective code, are: 
Table 1: Countries Selected and respective codes 
Norway Sweden Denmark Poland Switzerland United Kingdom Euro Zone 
NO SE DK PL CH UK EU 
Canada Brazil South Africa Japan South Korea Australia New Zealand 
CA BR ZA JP KR AU NZ 
 
Regarding the time horizon, some problems were intended to be avoided. First, it should 
comprise the period of Euro Zone as a Monetary Union, given its importance in Forex 
trading. Second, it should exclude a turbulent period in Asian currencies, as 
consequence of the Asian crash in 1997, which had strong implications on exchange 
rates. Therefore, the period between 1/1/2000 and 27/9/2013 was selected. The weekly 
frequency was chosen, considering the research‘s aim (short-run returns), the variables 
included (exchange rates are available within this frequency) and time horizon (too 
short to consider a larger frequency). 
                                                          
6 The selection criteria is deeply explained in Note 2 
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The main problem of choosing exchange rates is the limitation of available countries. 
As mentioned before, several countries, with economic preponderance in financial 
markets, are totally or partially excluded. Most of Asian countries (except South Korea 
and Japan) do not have float exchange rates and most of the European countries are 
included in Euro Zone. 
2.2) Real Exchange Rate: The literature points out to some persistence of the Meese 
and Rogoff puzzle, in the sense that existent structural models do not outperform the 
random walk in Nominal Exchange Rates (NER) forecast. Additionally, PPP suggests 
that Real Exchange Rate (RER) has no variation, what is not empirically supported, at 
least in short horizons, as Nikolaou (2006), for instance, suggests. Based on these two 
facts (unpredictability of NER and variation in RER), RER could be considered as the 
variable to forecast, instead of NER as used in most literature. Moreover, real exchange 
rates exclude the price effects, making this variable easier to model since it is not 
affected by the noise of prices. 
The RER is computed based as7: 
 
where R and N stand for Real and Nominal exchange rates, respectively, at time t, 
between the US and country-i, while  and  are relative to Price Index in the US 
and country-i, respectively. 
NER were obtained from Bloomberg, considering the last price value, on a weekly 
basis. The problem of the forward looking bias is inexistent since the closing time is the 
same for every security (US closing time). 
                                                          
7 The discussion about methodology is made in note 3. 
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A discussion about the price index measure, to compute RER, is made in Ellis (2001), 
where the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is suggested as the typical indicator to be used, 
given the large data existence for all countries. Accordingly, and even though in the 
case of competitiveness measure other indicators are recommended in the 
abovementioned literature (producer price or unit labor cost), I opted for CPI since this 
estimation focus mainly on financial markets models, rather than productivity models. 
The computations and assumptions are detailed in Note 4. Then, the CPI for each week 
was calculated as: 
 
However, the CPI considered in these computations is relative to the US, so the price 
change in the US have also to be considered: 
 
Having the relative prices for each country, the computation of the RER are now 
possible, using equation (1). 
Considering that the basis of this research is the augmented prediction regression 
suggested by Rapach, Strauss and Guofu (2013), the returns of RER were considered as 
the dependent variable, which were computed as: 
 
Finally, the same literature calculates the excess returns, using each country’s three-
month Treasury bill. Nevertheless, the return measures the appreciation or depreciation 
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of USD against other currency, so, for every return, the US Government Bonds with 3 
months of maturity was considered as risk free8.  
Hence, the RER is the focus of this research. For financial markets, the high frequency 
is extremely useful, since it provides a more continuous perception, which is not 
provided by most of the mentioned literature. Regarding the business strategy, the high 
frequency is useful for short-term matters, while the inclusion of inflation gives a better 
perception about the intrinsic value of currencies. For policy-makers, the real factor of 
this variable is also important, but the time-frequency is not the most used in its models, 
which usually include macro variables that are only available on a quarterly or yearly 
frequency.  
2.3) Yield curve variables: As mentioned in the literature review, Chen and Ang 
(2013) present two predictors that, representing an important factor of each country’s 
risk, are significant in exchange rate forecasting. Despite the differences between both 
models (in variables to forecast and the model used9), term spread and level of yield 
curve were considered as an interesting indicator to control each country’s risk in this 
case. Hence, the formulas indicated in the study were considered to compute these 
indicators: 
 
Where y is the long-term interest are and r is the short-term interest rate. 
Contrary to what is indicated in the abovementioned study, the short-term interest rate 
considered was the 1 year government bonds, while for the long-term was the 10 years 
government bond (tickers are presented in Note 5). The time horizon was the one 
                                                          
8 This risk-free rate is in annual basis, so it was converted into weekly basis by dividing by 12 months and, then, by 4 weeks. 
9 In fact, the study uses risk premium as dependent variable and cross-sectional predictability in a panel of currencies. 
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previously mentioned, with the same weekly frequency, and the data was obtained from 
Bloomberg. 
Despite the similarities between both indicators, they present different conclusions. On 
the one hand, the interest rate level represents the absolute value of interest rates or, in 
other words, describes the parallel movements of the yield curve. On the other, the term 
spread indicates the difference between short and long maturities, or the slope of the 
yield curve10.  
Table 2: Correlations among variables 
  US NO SE DK PL CH UK EU CA BR ZA JP KR AU NZ 
Term-Level 0,29 0,01 0,26 -0,05 0,17 -0,24 0,00 0,17 -0,10 -0,63 0,00 0,74 0,17 0,02 0,07 
Term-RER   0,02 -0,04 -0,01 -0,14 -0,07 0,14 0,04 0,08 -0,08 0,06 0,16 0,03 0,21 0,01 
Change-RER   0,07 -0,07 -0,02 -0,10 0,06 0,03 0,04 -0,19 -0,11 0,07 0,02 -0,06 0,05 -0,25 
 
From Table 1 some interesting conclusion can be taken. The correlation among 
explanatory variables were performed, in order to identify potential problems of 
multicollinearity. Thus, it is possible to observe that, for the majority of countries, the 
level of correlation is low. The only exceptions are Brazil (-0.63) and Japan (0.74), 
which present significant correlation between Level and Term variables11. Notice that 
the yield variables do not present significant correlation with RER, whose lagged 
returns are also explanatory variables. All in all, the purpose of the inclusion of these 
yield variables is to control for country risk, and not to increase the significance of the 
model. 
 
                                                          
10 Even though the yield curve does not have a linear format, this difference expresses a similar idea. 
11 The main problem of multicollinearity is that significant variables may loss its significance by including high correlated variables. 
In this case, it does not affect the coefficient of RER lagged returns, so is not relevant for the results. 
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3) Univariate Time Series - Linear Model 
The intention of this research is to find causality of some exchange rate returns on the 
movement of others. Thus, the proper methodology is a regression, rather than 
correlation, which simply measures the degree of linear association between two 
variables12 and disregards the inclusion of further regressors. 
3.1) Model description: As described in the Introduction, Rapach, Strauss and Guofu 
(2013) proposed a model that, by including the lagged returns of other countries, allows 
the causality relationship to be tested. The same idea is considered in this research, but 
adapted to exchange rates. In addition, the other variables identified by the literature as 
relevant for exchange rate predictability – Term spread and Level – are also included. 
Initially, only one lag of each of the four variables is considered (country-i, country-j, 
term-i and level-i), but some adjustments are made later on. Thus, the first model 
proposed is:  
 
Where r is the return of RER, T is the change in term spread and L is the change in 
interest rate level, as defined in section 2. 
The mentioned literature is based on OLS estimators, which are considered BLUE13, 
and those estimators are applied in this case as well. The model is estimated for the 14 
selected countries, using the same 14 countries as predictors. The period considered 
starts in 14/1/2000 and ends in 27/9/2013, including 715 observations. Despite the 
importance of yield curve variables and country-i lagged return, the main variable 
focused in country-j’s return, which reveals the possible causality in returns. However, 
                                                          
12 Brooks, 2008, p. 28.  
13 Brooks (pp. 44-46) mentions that OLS is assumed to be Best Linear Unbiased Estimators, which is the result of certain 




before analysing the results, some adjustments to the model are made, in order to 
guarantee the adequateness of the estimators. 
The validity of the OLS estimators implies that heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the errors is not observed, otherwise the estimators would not be efficient and 
consistent. The first problem is controlled through White’s heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors (see more details in note 6). The second problem can be detected 
through the Breusch-Godfrey test14 and solved with the inclusion of certain variables 
that were previously ignored and are significant for the model (to control for 
autocorrelation). This procedure is described in more detail in note 7. Having these 
issues solved, the model was estimated, with the additional variables considered. A 
detailed analysis of the results will now be presented.  
3.2) Correlations: Before analysing the causality in real exchange rates, the correlation 
among these indicators is calculated in order to identify potential conclusions from the 
proposed model. Thus, the four more significant correlations for each country are 
presented in Table A.1.  
First of all, the correlations are positive in most of the cases, being Japan the only 
exception, but with low significance. The second conclusion is that there is a strong 
correlation among European countries, which is consistent with the regional proximity. 
A third conclusion, Australia is identified as the most correlated with most of the non-
European countries. The fourth conclusion, which is also consistent with regional 
proximity, is that New Zealand and Australia are correlated with the same countries 
(Canada and Sweden), besides the correlation between both. Finally, the non-European 
                                                          
14 The same literature suggests this test, which have as advantage the joint significance test for the autocorrelation between errors term and 
several other lags. 
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countries have weak correlation with the countries considered, what can be justified by 
the inexistence of countries of the same continent.  
Having this first approach, the regional factor was identified as a potential justification 
for the model results. The next step is a linear regression, which has as the main 
advantage the possibility to identify causality. 
3.3) Results: Causality is identified through the coefficient of country-j, both in terms 
of significance and absolute value. For the former, a significance test was performed, in 
order to understand whether the estimated coefficients, based on certain assumptions 
and a certain sample, are close to reality. In case of significant coefficients, the 
distinction is made by considering the different level of significance15. The final results 
are presented in Table A.2 and a summary of significant coefficients in Table A.3. This 
subsection aims to identify regressors that can potentially explain some RER returns, as 
well as regressands which may be significantly explained.  
From both tables, some considerations can be made. First of all, 13 of the 14 countries 
were identified as significant regressors for, at least, one country, while 9 countries were 
identified as being significantly regressed16. Specifically, 32 significant relations (17 at 
10% significance, 12 at 5% and 2 at 1%) were found. In addition, some countries can be 
clearly defined as regressors or regressand, and the only exception is KR, which is 
significant in both cases. The three more relevant regressors (SE, DK and EU) are 
significant for exactly the same five countries (CH, UK, KR, AU, NZ), where UK and 
AU are the most significantly regressed by them17.  
                                                          
15 The significance levels considered were 1%, 5% and 10%. 
16 From this analysis, it is possible to identify those countries which are not relevant in any case, using the same criteria as in 
rankings: NO, PL, BR, ZA and JP.  
17 Considering a significant level of less than 5%. 
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3.4) Crisis influence: The Financial Crisis, which began to emerge somewhere in 2007, 
led authorities to avoid the mistakes made in the Great Depression, when currencies 
depreciated sharply and international trade was decimated. According to Weber and 
Wyplozs (2009), Central Banks’ policy focused on quantitative easing, with the 
intention to contradict the lack of liquidity in the market. Additionally, it is noticed that, 
in contrast to what occurred in 1930s, exchange rates are, nowadays for most of 
currencies, subject to market sentiment, so Government have not the same influence as 
before.  
This context raises interesting questions, and identifies the period that started with the 
financial markets collapse as a potential source of the significant results. An interesting 
question is raised by Weber and Wyplozs (2009), in what concerns the discussion on 
over- and undervaluation of certain currencies, given its current account position. In 
addition, Kohler (2010) points that this crisis has presented different characteristics 
from the previous (with lower magnitude and widespread), mainly in correlation among 
asset classes, and also within asset classes. For these two reasons, isolate Financial 
Crisis, which still persists currently, can lead to curious conclusions.  
The period was defined by the Lehman-Brothers collapse in 15/9/2008, since it 
represents the beginning of the crisis in financial markets. In other words, within this 
period, markets of several securities registered an uncommon volatility and huge losses. 
Thus, the intention of this analysis is to verify the difference in causality between the 
periods before and during crisis. Despite the recent recovery in financial markets, it has 
not been solid yet, so the crisis period was considered until 27/9/2013.  
Concerning OLS estimation validity, the same methodology was used. Nevertheless, for 
autocorrelation correction, in some cases, the included variables are not the same, since 
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the problem was not detected in the same variables. Then, it was possible to estimate an 
identicamodel as expressed in equation 7. The results and a summary for period before 
the crisis (model 1.2) are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The same statistics for the crisis 
period (model 1.3) are presented on Tables 6 and 7. 
3.5) Comparative analysis: The overall period results provided some interesting 
conclusions. However, in order to verify the influence of crisis on those results, as a 
consequence of increasing correlations during financial turbulence, the sub-periods 
before and after the Lehman-Brothers Collapse were analysed.  
Table 3: Summary for the three periods (number of significance regressors and 
regressands) 
    Regressors 
    NO SE DK PL CH UK EU CA BR ZA JP KR AU NZ Total 












 * 0 1 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 17 8 9 
** 0 0 0 4 4 1 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 8 12 
*** 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 
    0 1 1 5 8 2 5 1 3 3 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 3 1 3 3 0 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 0 2 4 0 7 1 0 0 1 1 0 32 21 22 
                                                                                              
    Regressands 
    NO SE DK PL CH UK EU CA BR ZA JP KR AU NZ Total 












 * 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 1 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 17 8 9 
** 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 3 2 5 2 0 3 13 8 12 
*** 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 
    1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 7 2 2 4 6 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 5 3 3 7 3 8 4 1 4 32 21 22 
 
The table above gives a wider perspective, and three initial conclusions can be 
highlighted. First, the overall period presents 32 significant coefficients, while the 
period before and after present 21 and 22, respectively. This fact is not consistent with 
an expected higher correlation among securities during the crisis, as well as a higher 
numbers of significant coefficients, but may be due to the different and longer sample 
period used in overall period. The second general conclusion concerns the mean of the 
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significant coefficients, where the overall period presents a value of 0.128, while before 
and after the values are 0.102 and 0.232, respectively. In this case, the impact of the 
crisis is more visible, with a considerably higher coefficient. Finally, the period before 
the crisis contains 5 coefficient significant at 1%, 4 of them occurring with the UK as 
regressand.  
Having an overall perspective of the three periods, the focus turns to particular 
countries, which have relevance as regressors or regressands. Thus, three main 
conclusions should be highlighted about regressors. The first conclusion regards the 
Swedish Krona, given its significance for 8 countries within the period before the crisis. 
In contrast, during the crisis, it is only significant for Australia and South Korea, the 
only countries that are consistently regressed in the three periods by SE. The second 
conclusion is identic for the Euro and Danish Krone, since both currencies are 
significant for the same 5 countries in the overall period18. By observing the results, it is 
possible to conclude that, except for the UK, these countries are significant exclusively 
during the crisis period, what leads to the idea that financial turbulence explains its role. 
This similar path is potentially explained by the strong correlation between the two 
countries (0.99), what, however, did not result in a causality relationship. The third 
conclusion about regressors is the significance of the Korean Won during the crisis 
period (significant for 7 countries), which is not observable in period 2.  
The regressands analysis aims to identify currencies whose behaviour can be modelled 
by other currency’s returns. The first evidence occurs with Swiss Franc, even though the 
significance is only present in the overall period. Contrarily, the Korean Won is 
significantly explained by 5 countries in the overall period. However, the analysis of the 
two sub-periods is not conclusive, since for DK and JP the crisis seems to be the main 
                                                          
18 Despite different significance levels, they are significant for CHF, GBP, KRW, AUD and NZD in overall period. 
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reason, while for SE and ZA, the period before the crisis is significant at a 5%. The 
third conclusion is the success of the model to explain the UK returns before the crisis, 
considering that 4 countries are significant at a 1% significance level. Finally, the crisis 
also had a great impact, with similar magnitude, on Australia and New Zealand, since 
most of the significant coefficients in the overall period are also significant during the 
crisis period.  
The results summarized above are largely conclusive about which countries are 
significant for the model before and after the crisis. Accordingly, Sweden presents 
capacity to explain several countries’ returns before the crisis period, while Denmark 
and the Euro Zone are relevant during the crisis period. The UK case is extremely 
interesting, but it is inconclusive about which regressor is more accurate. Evidence was 
also found that the crisis had impact on Australian and New Zealand returns. The main 
contribution of this analysis, besides the results, is the recognition that a turbulent 
period as Financial Crisis could not be ignored, and would influence the results and, 
thus, the conclusions about countries’ causality. A deeper analysis will be presented 
latter on, in order to identify in more detail the causality found in the linear model.   
4) Multivariate Time Series - VAR 
The Linear Regression Model identified several significant relationships among the 
exchange rates, for the three periods analysed.  As previously mentioned, certain 
countries were pointed out as significant regressors and/or regressands. This conclusion 
implies that the regressors are exogenous since, in most cases, its values are generated 
outside the model. Moreover, certain countries are significantly explained by more than 
one exchange rate, what may be consequence of the individual test and “hidden 
information” behind some of those coefficients. These two potential problems expose 
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the Linear Model’s limitations, since it is not flexible enough to consider a large number 
of regressors (due to autocorrelation or efficiency of the model), and do not consider 
variables as, simultaneously, regressors and regressand. For these reasons, a Vector 
Autoregressive Model (VAR) was adopted, in order to include more variables as 
explanatory (both exogenous and endogenous), and to conclude about the regressors 
which are truly significant19.  
4.1) Model description: A VAR Model was performed for each period, and the 
inclusion of countries was restricted in order to have the model as efficient as possible. 
The methodology used is described in note 8, concerning the selection criteria for 
variables, as well as the carry and equity variables included to control for other events 
not detected by the model. This procedure avoids a drawback of VAR, which is 
existence of several parameters and the consequent loss of degrees of freedom in 
estimation. Consequently, it changes the intrinsic meaning of VAR, which considers all 
the variables as, simultaneously, regressors and regressands. Despite this fact, the 
results remain accurate, so the model will be mentioned as a VAR. 
As occurred with the Linear Model, the VAR Model also may generate inefficient 
estimations if the OLS properties are not guaranteed. Regarding autocorrelation, the 
same procedure used in Linear Model is applied. However, in this case, the inclusion of 
one more lag of an endogenous variable implies more lags for the remaining 
endogenous variables, which penalizes the efficiency of the model, so this process was 
limited. In addition, lags of the exogenous variable were also used to control this 
problem. Regarding heteroskedasticity, the procedure was distinct from the used in 
Linear Model, as is explained in note 9. 
                                                          
19 All the methodology used had as support Brooks (2008), pp 273-276 and 290-314. 
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Having the initial model performed, and the problems controlled, the results are 
analysed. In order to have a more efficient model, the irrelevant regressors were 
excluded from the sample, respecting the following criteria: a) Not significant for any 
endogenous variable; and b) Not relevant to control autocorrelation. Then, a new model 
was estimated, resulting in final coefficient values. Finally, it is possible to compare the 
results between the Linear Model and the VAR, concluding about which regressors are 
truly significant. 
4.2) Results: The initial purpose of the research was to use the overall period and, then, 
identify the most significant relationships among exchange rates. Nevertheless, it was 
firstly suggested that the Financial Crisis may have altered the causality until then, so 
the whole period was divided in before (period 2) and during the crisis (period 3). The 
Linear Models have already shown that results are different. On the stage, the intention 
is to understand if, with a more sophisticated model, the results are the same.  
Before the Crisis (period 2): This period excludes the financial turbulence, when the 
correlation among asset classes and within asset classes is stronger, and try to illustrate 
a “normal” behaviour of exchange rates. Again, I firstly selected the relevant 
regressands as endogenous variables, and then the significant regressors for them. As 
endogenous variables I included UK, South Korea and Australia, while as exogenous 
countries I chose Sweden, Switzerland, Euro Zone and Canada. Then the model was 
performed, from which the following conclusion can be highlighted (since there is no 







Table 4: VAR Model. Coefficients before the Financial Crisis 
    Regressands 













RUK-1 -0,13 0,06 -0,07 
RKR-1 -0,04 0,01 0,00 








RSE-1 0,15 0,20 0,24 
RCH-1 0,26 0,12 0,04 
REU-1 -0,24 -0,29 -0,21 
RCA-1 0,05 0,07 0,16 
 
a) Canada loses its significance for the UK and SK, and keeps for AU (0.16). This 
fact is not only due to hetereskedasticity, since the coefficients for the UK and 
SK changed from 0.102 and 0.093 to 0.05 and 0.07, respectively. Thus, the 
inclusion of the three variables simultaneously shows that Canada is the most 
powerful to explains AU returns.  
b) Sweden is the only regressor that remains significant for the endogenous 
variables (0.151 for UK, 0.196 for KR and 0.24 for AU).  
c) Nevertheless, the Euro Zone presents the highest coefficients for UK and KR (-
0.242 and -0.288). Interestingly, both coefficients are negative, contrary to the 
remaining.  
d) Finally, it is interesting to notice that the Euro Zone and Switzerland have 
almost symmetric coefficients for the UK (-0.242 and 0.263, respectively).  
e) Besides the cross-significance, I would highlight the relevant role of Australia 
Carry and Level for the three endogenous variables during the period before the 
crisis, having the former a negative impact and the latter a positive (Table A.9). 
During the Crisis (period 3): As in the Linear Model, this period illustrates the 
relationship among exchange rates during most part of the Financial Crisis. For this 
period, a slight different approach was applied to select variables. First, I considered 
the most relevant regressands, which are explained by more than one regressor: 
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South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Then, I selected the regressors which 
were significant for them (only ignoring the less significant): Sweden, Euro Zone, 
Japan and UK20. Notice that South Korea is used as explained and explanatory 
variable, so its significance for Australia and New Zealand is controlled. 
Table 5: VAR Model. Coefficients during the Financial Crisis 
    Regressands 











RKR(-1) 0,13 0,30 0,35 
RAU(-1) -0,20 -0,35 -0,21 








RSE(-1) 0,21 0,07 0,09 
REU(-1) 0,11 0,31 0,25 
RUK(-2) 0,02 -0,18 -0,16 
RJP(-1) 0,11 -0,06 -0,10 
 
a) South Korea is no longer significantly explained by Japan, becoming Sweden 
and Australia its reference “return drivers”, with a coefficient of 0.213 and 0.2, 
respectively. On the one hand, Sweden assumes now a stronger impact, 
considering the previous coefficient of 0.146. On the other, Australia, which was 
not significant previously, assumes a relevant role.  
b) For Australia and New Zealand as endogenous variables, the results do not 
change significantly, since most of the countries (South Korea, Euro Zone and 
UK) remain significant. The main change is the relevance of Australia to explain 
New Zealand returns, with a considerable coefficient of -0.213.  
c) Interestingly, Australia’s effect on New Zealand and South Korea is negative, 
what can lead to unexpected conclusions, since the most expected sign, given 
the geographical factor, would be positive.  
d) The UK is an uncommon case in this research since it presents strong 
significance with two lags for Australia and New Zealand. Even though the 
                                                          
20 For this specific case, it was found significance at lag-2. 
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intuition is the same, it would be interesting to understand why the UK’s returns 
have a delayed effect on these exchange rates, compared to the other 
relationships.  
e) Other important conclusions, which are not the main focus of this research, ate 
related to the variables to control specific risk (see table A.9). In this case, both 
Level and Carry Poland are significant for all the endogenous variables, so they 
may present a representative behaviour of market sentiment, since Poland was 
not included on this final model. 
f) Finally, S&P500, as representative of equity market, only has significance with 
three lags (three weeks). This result is surprising, since the correlation among 
asset classes were expected to increase, namely the contemporaneous. However, 
this effect may have been extracted from other returns.  
Table 6: Overall significance (Adjusted R-squared) 
  Before the Crisis (Period 2) During the Crisis (Period 3) 
Regressands UK KR AU KR AU NZ 
Linear 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.076 0.073 0.057 
VAR 0.044 0.052 0.047 0.233 0.250 0.205 
 
Through the values presented, it is possible to conclude that the VAR Model has higher 
significance than Linear Model for every period, and for every country. One potential 
explanation is the non-corrected heteroskedasticity, which misrepresents the value of 
significance. In addition, it is possible to conclude that the Financial Crisis, represented 
by period 3, may have affected the significance of the model, as a consequence of the 
increasing cross-correlation21. Moreover, the inclusion of carry and equity variables 
                                                          
21 Notice that in the VAR model where considered additional variables such as equity returns (S&P 500) and Carry, what also 
contributed to the level of significance.  
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may have benefited the overall significance (see Table A.9). The comparison between 
both models, in terms of coefficients, is presented in Table A.8. 
5) Discussion of empirical results 
The innovative approach for exchange rate models resulted in some interesting and 
significant relationships among the included countries. Nevertheless, these results may 
have been influenced by the sample used, or even other events that were not captured by 
the model. Therefore, an analysis about the intuition of the coefficients – both 
magnitude and sign - is complementary to the technical computation. In that sense, 
several indicators were considered, in order to suggest some justifications of the results 
obtained.  
The initial approach to compute the model was the entire period between 1/14/2000 and 
9/27/2013. However, I considered that the Financial Crisis, and the consequence 
turbulence in every asset class, may have influenced the coefficients. Hence, for this 
analysis, I focus on the results before (period 2) and during the crisis (period 3), from 
where the main conclusions are: 
Table 7: Summary of the results 
    Before Crisis   During Crisis 
    Regressands   Regressands 











RUK(-1) -0,13 0,06 -0,07 RKR(-1) 0,13 0,30 0,35 
RKR(-1) -0,04 0,01 0,00 RAU(-1) -0,20 -0,35 -0,21 








RSE(-1) 0,15 0,20 0,24 RSE(-1) 0,21 0,07 0,09 
RCH(-1) 0,26 0,12 0,04 REU(-1) 0,11 0,31 0,25 
REU(-1) -0,24 -0,29 -0,21 RUK(-2) 0,02 -0,18 -0,16 




5.1) International Trade: This indicator summarizes the exports and imports of one 
country to another22. The same countries as included in the model were considered, with 
the addition of four other relevant markets: US, China, India and Indonesia23. There are 
some literature arguing that imbalances in this indicator may contain information about 
the future path of exchange rates24. In this case, net exports or the overall trade among 
countries are used to have some intuition their relationship. 
United Kingdom: In the case of the UK, there were found significant coefficients for the 
period before the crisis. The coefficient of Euro (-0.242) is easily explained by the 
importance of the international trade with this economic block, which has represented 
40% of the total trade, during the whole period (Figure 1). In addition, the current 
imbalance of more than 1% of GDP with the Euro Area is a potential explanation for 
the negative relationship. The negative coefficient indicates that when EUR appreciated 
1pp, the GBP depreciated 0.242pp (ceteris paribus). Considering that EUR had 
appreciated over almost the whole period and GBP had appreciated always less than 
EUR, this coefficient makes sense. One potential reason is the intention by UK 
authorities to gain some competiveness against EUR, even though the overall variation 
had been positive (led by other factors)25. Another potential explanation is the 
preference of investors to buy EUR and sell GBP, given the overall economic 
environment or specific events on each economy (namely the persistent deficit of UK). 
Regarding Sweden and Switzerland, international trade does not seem to give any 
consistent explanation for the coefficients, given the reduced weight of both economies 
in UK trade.  
                                                          
22 Notice that this is not the same as current account, since does not include net primary and secondary income. 
23 Given its significant GDP and the existance of Southern Asian Countries, Indonesia could have some influence. 
24 Gourinchas and Rey (2007) 
25 Notice that this intervention does not breach the free floating, since is made through monetary policy, which indirectly influences 
the relative value of GBP.  
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Republic of Korea/ South Korea: During the period between 2000 and 2008 (collapse of 
the Lehman Brothers), South Korea presented a current surplus between 1.5% and 
3.5%, with the exception of 2008, when the crisis was more severe. In addition, the 
openness of its economy had consistently increased over that period, with the total trade 
moving from 60% to 90% of GDP. Regarding the partners (Figure 2), the results 
obtained are consistent with the economic dimension. However, the most interesting 
point visible in this chart is the increasing dominance of China, as occurs with other 
countries, during the whole period, which has substituted Japan and the US as the main 
partners of South Korea. This fact is approached by Weber and Wyplosz (2009), which 
highlight the benefits that China has had with the KRW depreciation until crisis erosion, 
since most of the Chinese exports incorporates imported manufactures, and South Korea 
is one of the main sources. This document does not suggest that China is the cause of 
the KRW behaviour, but it is reasonable to consider that the trade with China has 
encouraged its depreciation. The exports’ annual growth is consistent with this 
perspective, since the level to China achieved 22% until the Financial Crisis, while for 
the Euro Area and US it grew 13% and 3%, respectively.   
As mentioned before, Sweden has a significant positive coefficient in both periods. 
However, this significance is not illustrated in trade between both countries, since 
Sweden represents less than 2% of total trade and the balance does not have a consistent 
path (it becomes negative from 2008 onwards). The coefficient of Euro (-0.288) is a 
consequence of the strong appreciation of EUR, while KRW had appreciated slightly. 
This fact is in accordance with the Korean policy of gaining external competitiveness 
during the 2000’s, which is reported in an Economic Review report by Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi UFJ in 2010. This strategy focused on a strong incentive to certain industries 
(deepened later on), supported by a depreciation of KRW. In that sense, the negative 
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ceteris paribus effect of EUR can be potentially explained by the Korean’s strategy, 
also supported by the constant surpluses in net exports with the Euro Area during that 
period (close to 2% of Korean GDP from 2004 to 2008). In addition, it may also be 
related to the increasing influence of China, as mentioned before.  
Australia: Australia registered negative net exports, with some exceptions, above 2% of 
GDP before the crisis, inverting the trend after the Crisis. The trade with Euro Area 
contributed significantly for this situation, since the deficit has always exceeded 2% of 
GDP (Figure 3). As occurred with the previous countries, Euro Area, Japan, USA and 
China are the most significant partners, with New Zealand, UK and South Korea having 
a weight close to 5% each (Figure 4). However, the weight of international trade on 
GDP never exceeds 50%. Thus, the significance of Sweden (0.245) and Canada (0.159) 
during the period before the crisis is not explainable by these analysis, while during the 
crisis some intuition seems to be present. The strong positive correlation across 
securities is typical during turbulent periods, and this fact is visible in the Euro (0.307) 
and Korean Won (0.296) coefficients. The Euro influence is explainable by its 
dimension in international trade, besides the abovementioned deficit, while the KRW 
impact may be related to a regional effect. Nevertheless, these significant coefficients 
may also be related to the decline in its relative importance in favour of China26, since 
AUD did not depreciate significantly against these currencies, so the competitiveness 
improvements was not attained though devaluation. 
New Zealand: I found some in-sample significance for NZD during the crisis period, 
and some of the reasons may be related to international trade position. New Zealand had 
presented chronic net exports deficits until the crisis, almost always above 3%, as may 
                                                          
26 More evident in Euro Area, where the share decreased from 12,5% to 9%, while China’s position raised moved from 13,5% to 
19% within the same period.  
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be observed in Figure 5. With the crisis, this imbalance seems to have been corrected, 
with the achievement of two consecutive years of positive accounts (2010 and 2011). 
This imbalance shows a slight inversion of the previous trend. The Euro coefficient 
(0.248) is fairly justifiable by the weight of the trade with this economic block (Figure 
6), while South Korean coefficient (0.353) is more difficult to justify, mainly due to its 
large value. Nevertheless, and as pointed out in the South Korea analysis, its policy also 
resorts to currency depreciation, to achieve a more competitive position, which seems to 
be in accordance with the NZ behaviour.  
5.2) Equity market and economic linkages: The previous analysis has suggested that 
the dimension of certain economies or their policies may have influenced the results. In 
this topic, the possibility that some countries, which apparently do not have a visible 
relationship, may have particular similarities is raised. Rapach, Strauss and Guofu 
(2013), in a context of equities relationship, found not only the US as the main “return-
driver”, but also the significance of Sweden and Switzerland. Considering the small 
dimension of these economies, it was argued that market concentration could be a 
potential justification since shocks on fundamentals are quickly impounded into large 
companies and, in case of market concentration, that effect is more highlighted. This 
event is known as information frictions. Naturally, the impact on equities is more 
evident, but it gives an idea of the exposure to the financial system. Figure 7 shows the 
market capitalization measured in GDP, as an average for each period, from where it is 
possible to observe the large value, during the period before the crisis, in Sweden 
(111%), Switzerland (250%), UK (139%), South Africa (200%) and Australia (119%). 
Interestingly, most of these countries were found significant, as regressors or 
regressands, in the model proposed. Thus, the exposure to the equity market, 
represented by this indicator, can justify these narrower relationships. Regarding market 
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concentration, I present the data from 2007, which is the turning point between the two 
periods, in Figure 8. Consistently with the argumentation of the abovementioned 
document, Sweden (35%) and Switzerland (50%) present high values.  
Apart from the information frictions, the economic similarities may also contribute to 
explain the exchange rate path. In particular, if countries are specialized in certain 
industries, they are subject to the same trends in those markets, and their exchange rates 
will reflect that. 
Figure 9 presents the industry breakdown in terms of Market Cap of 2007, based on top 
10 companies previously used, from where some interesting relationships can be 
observed. First of all, the dimension of the Financial Sector is significant in Australia 
(80%), UK (53%) and Canada (76%), which is typically a strongly cyclical industry. As 
presented before, Australia is significantly regressed by Canada (0.159) before the crisis 
and by the UK (-0,182) during the crisis. In case of Canada, the weight of the Financial 
Sector is enormous, as well as in Australia, so both countries have benefited from the 
prosperous period until the crisis, what can potentially explain this similar, even slight, 
path in exchange rates. However, the causality of Canada on Australia, and not the 
inverse, is more difficult to explain. The second point is the significant weight of the 
Technological Sector in Sweden (47%), Switzerland (44%) and South Korea (53%). 
Indeed, Sweden is the most consistent coefficient, namely for South Korea, with 
positive values in before and during the crisis periods. This means that an appreciation 
of SEK against USD in a certain period, led to an appreciation of KRW in the following 
period.  
Regarding this last point, I observed the investment in R&D to confirm the 
technological profile of those countries. The results in Figure 10 confirm that both 
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Sweden and Korea have had a strong investment in this area during the last decade. 
However, while Swedish investment remains stable, the Korean suffered a sharp 
increase. In the latter case, it is clearly related to the country’s focus on the export 
profile, by depreciating the currency and invest in value-added products, as is 
mentioned in Economic Review report by Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi UFJ in 2010. 
Figure 11 provides the weight of high-technology exports in manufactured exports, and 
the conclusions are interesting. While South Korea has stable values (with a decline in 
crisis), the indicator suffers a continuous decline in Sweden, moving from 18% in 2002 
to 13% in 2011. Before using these two facts, I analysed the Swedish companies’ 
profile, namely in terms of Employees in each sector in 2010. The distribution of 
employees, of each industry, by Sweden and Abroad is presented in Figure 12. The 
strategy of Swedish companies to invest abroad becomes clear, with a notable 
discrepancy in Fabricated Metal Products and Computer and Electronics Industries 
(percentage of almost 80% of employees in abroad). In addition, if the same analysis is 
made to the largest Swedish companies, the conclusion is the same. All in all, if these 
four figures are simultaneously considered, two main potential explanations can be 
raised: a) The investment in R&D by Sweden is directed to foreign investment, since 
the results have not been visible in terms of exports, and the technological industry is 
the most relevant in top companies (who is benefiting from Swedish investment?); b) 
South Korea is one of the benefiters of this strategy since, besides its investment in 
R&D, the know-how from “Swedish multinational” companies, even in small dimension 
(given the number of employees in Figure 13 and its small amount comparing to the 
other economies), may have been crucial to this path. In addition, it is notable the larger 
amount of allocated employees to services, which may be associated to R&D. With that 
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purpose, I picked Ericsson27, a Swedish company, as representative of this potential 
trend and analysed its position in a geographical perspective28. Figures 14 and 15 show 
indicators that give an impression about this idea: While assets, between 2007 and 2009, 
do not allow any conclusion, the revenues’ weight has increased, specifically for the rest 
of North East Asia, which is mainly composed by Japan and South Korea.  
This last paragraph raised the idea that Sweden coefficient significance on South Korea 
may be supported on a sort of “technological effect”. In order to deepen this possibility, 
a Linear Model was regressed, by including the same companies of both countries29 
used in Figures 12, considering KR as regressand and SE as regressor. This procedure is 
present in Note 10. The main conclusions, for both periods, are: a) Before crisis, the 
only significant company is Samsung (Korean) (0.025 at 10% significance), with all the 
remaining Swedish and Korean companies’ stocks being non-significant; b) During 
crisis, where the cross-correlation in asset classes increases, the KOSPI (-0.18 at 5%) 
and Samsung (-0.07 at 10%) were significant, while Ericsson has significance at 10% 
(0.06), and Nordea and SEB-Skand (both Swedish) are the significant at 1% and 5%, 
curiously both from Banking Sector.  
Concluding, this introductory approach of using technological companies to explain 
South Korea’s returns were not entirely successful (even though Samsung had had some 
significance before crisis and Ericsson after the crisis), since the SE coefficient 
remained, or even increased, and the main result being natural (banks are more expected 
to be the most cyclical companies during Financial Crisis). Nevertheless, this procedure 
may bring future results since, as the bank’s returns significance showed, it was strongly 
affected by crisis.  
                                                          
27 ERICB SS Equity; Described as a Technological company. 




5.3) Income and Capital flows: The “Net Income from Abroad” indicator reflects the 
transaction that involves incomes from labour (migrants) or capital (from financial and 
nonfinancial claims). Thus, an inflow is expected to appreciate a currency, while an 
outflow to depreciate. The variation of this indicator may be due to two factor. First, it 
may be a consequence of the economic environment: since income from capital and 
labour increases, it has the same positive effect on countries which have a chronic 
surplus. This is the case of the CHF coefficient (0.263) on UK before the crisis, where 
the former have an average of 6% and the latter 1% of GDP, being the countries with a 
highest indicator, which justifies the positive sign. Second, during adverse situations, 
labour and capital (more flexible) tend to move to countries with safer conditions (Safe 
Haven countries), or to the origin. This might be the case of the UK coefficients for 
Australia (-0.19) and New Zealand (-0.16), which have an average net inflows of -4% 
and -4.2% during Financial Crisis, respectively30. Hence, this might have been 
consequence of the reallocation from these countries to the UK (the origin of the 
capital) and of a deleveraging process. 
The “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflow” is a potential tool to explain the 
relevance of certain countries, and also the link between them. In Figure 16 it is possible 
to observe the weight of FDI in certain economies, more evident during the period 
before the crisis. Sweden, UK and Switzerland have had high levels, so the capital 
transferred to these countries may influence the behavior of exchange rates. The 
relationship among countries would reinforce this analysis, in order to understand if the 
trade flow between two countries is consistent with the coefficients. All in all, These 
two indicators have been tested by several studies, and the results were not the most 
                                                          
30 This values are based on World Bank data base. 
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favorable31. Nevertheless, this procedure only aimed to make a complementary analysis, 
and not use them as variables.  
5.4) Carry Trade with AUD and NZD: The most common carry trade strategy 
consists in a long-short position on two interest rates. By investing in a certain interest 
rate, the increasing demand on that currency leads to its appreciation, while the shorted 
currency tends to depreciate. Nevertheless, this causality is contemporaneous, so the 
same intuition is not applied in the model. In this case, a currency appreciation is an 
incentive to purchase foreign assets, which are relatively cheaper. In other words, if a 
certain currency appreciates, investors tend to sell a position in, for instance, 
Government bonds of that country and buy the same asset of the other country. Hence, 
the currency of the country that corresponds to the long-position is expected to 
appreciate, led by the previous appreciation. The most relevant indicators to define this 
strategy are return (yield) and risk (volatility), so I present the summarized statistics for 
these two indicators for the countries that were found significant in Tables A.10 and 
A.11. For the period before the crisis, the most attractive long-positions are Australia, 
New Zealand and the UK, while for short-positions (with low funding cost) are Sweden, 
Switzerland and Euro. Accordingly, carry trades including the abovementioned long 
and short positions would naturally lead to a positive coefficient, as occurs in most of 
cases (see Table 7). This effect is mostly visible in the CH coefficient (0.263) on the 
UK, which represented a potential trade given the low risk of both countries’ securities. 
In addition, the SE coefficients on the UK and AU may have also been influenced by 
this fact. The carry trade paradigm has completely changed with the Financial Crisis; 
see Bilson (2013). In this small reflection, the author mentions that long-positions in 
carry trade were less attractive due to quantitative easing applied by the major 
                                                          
31 Rossi 2013 summarizes several studies regarding exchange rates, and mentiones these two indicators as not successful 
explanatory variables comparing to randm walk. 
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economies, which decreased the return in its Government bonds. As an alternative to 
this less attractive risk-free long-positions (UK is the most evident case), he points out 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand or Mexico, which however present a 
significantly high currency fluctuation. Despite this risk, New Zealand and, with more 
strength, Australia have presented good indicators in terms of Sovereign risk (AA+ and 
AAA, respectively, by S&P), which can minimize the investors’ fears. John Weavers32 
reinforces this idea for Australia, which was an exception in quantitative easing policy 
in Triple-A countries, mentioning that a significant investment in a Government bond 
issue in November have come from foreign investors.  
The previous facts sustain the idea that carry trade is a potential explanation for some of 
the coefficients found, namely during the crisis. Besides USD and JPY, the most 
representative currency for short-position is EUR, and it presents coefficient estimates 
of 0.31 and 0.25, for AU and NZ, respectively, consistent with the previously 
mentioned perspective. Regarding the UK coefficients (-0.18 and -0.16, respectively), a 
different approach has to be applied. As mentioned, the UK was no longer attractive as 
long-position so, possibly, investors have reallocated its capital applied in UK 
Government bonds to Australia and New Zealand. Thus, the depreciation of GBP and 
the consequent appreciation of AUD and NZD may be justified by this movement in 
financial markets33. In fact, during this period, the RER of GBP has depreciated 0.5% 
against USD, while AUD and NZD have appreciated 11% and 46%, respectively. 
Regarding the KR coefficients for both AUD and NZD, they are difficult to explain by 
carry trade, and seem to have been a coincidence of two distinct facts. While the AU 
and NZ have benefited from the abovementioned event, the KR, which have sharply 
depreciated its currency in the period before crisis (not exclusively against USD), had a 
                                                          
32 Article in Reuters “Carry trade helps Australia deepen bond market” 26/11/2013 
33 The significance of UK is only verified at lag-2 what leads to the same interpretation given the short time frequency used. 
33 
 
more stable situation after the crisis erosion. Finally, AU was found significant for NZ 
(-0.21) and this is consistent with the same argumentation developed in UK coefficient 
to AU and NZ. 
In addition, the Net Foreign Assets is pointed out by Gourinchas and Rey (2007) as an 
exchange rates predictor. Figure 17 presents this indicator for the countries now 
analysed. Before the crisis, it was mentioned that AU, NZ and UK were the most 
attractive countries to buy in carry trade, which corresponds to a negative Net Foreign 
Assets. The figure is consistent with this view, even though the indicator considers 
several other investments besides Government bonds (associated with carry trade). 
Naturally, the UK value is much lower given its dimension in economic and financial 
terms. In the same way, the countries  that were pointed out as potential short-positions 
(SE, CH) or even Japan and US, have positive indicators, which suggest that the value 
of foreign assets held by resident investors (includes Government bonds of AU, NZ and 
UK) is higher than the value of local assets held by non-residents (local Governement 
bonds, for instance). With the crisis erosion, this indicator suffered a slight inversion, as 
a consequence of deleveraging in the economy. Nevertheless, those values remain 
significant for the AU and NZ, while, for the UK, they became positive, which is 
consistent with the previous argument. Notice that the EU has an insignificant value, 
which is acceptable given its huge dimension.  
6) Conclusion 
This research looked for causality among returns of Real Exchange Rates, with financial 
markets as the main target. Having exposed interesting results, they were also dissected, 
in order to identify possible facts that may have influenced them. Nevertheless, the 
arguments proposed can be speculative, and its accuracy difficult to prove. However, 
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given its apparent reasonability, I considered them as a good fit to the reality of 
financial markets.   
6.1) Research contribution: The main contributor for this research was the work of 
Rapach, Strauss and Guofu (2013). This document proposes a lead-lag relationship of 
stock returns, being US the main driver. The results were not similar in the case of this 
research, perhaps due to limited securities available or to distinct idiosyncrasies of this 
asset class. However, the innovation is evident in what concerns exchange rates, given 
the significance found in certain cases. In addition, I limited the misrepresentation of the 
approach due to Financial Crisis by assuming two distinct periods. The procedure was 
successful since both periods presented different results. The use of a more 
sophisticated model (VAR), with the addition of other variables, assured that some 
limitations of Linear Models would be corrected. Finally, I picked the most 
representative regressors and regressands and tried to build a solid argument. I proposed 
not only structural facts (International Trade, economic structure in industries), but also 
more specific events (monetary policy, changes in economic environment and the crisis) 
to justify the performance of exchange rates. All in all, this research does not propose a 
consolidated model, but gives a first step to the inclusion of other countries’ exchange 
rate returns in forecast models. 
6.2) Main findings: The first model intended to identify causality in countries 
individually and, then, applied a VAR model which considered the significant countries 
simultaneously. After identifying the most relevant results, I proposed some 
interpretations that could have partially justified the coefficients calculated.  
The UK was found as significantly regressed by CH, EU, and SE during the period 
before the crisis. The EU, with a coefficient of -0.24, is representative in UK’s 
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International Trade (40%) and is responsible for the high deficit presented by UK. 
During an appreciation of the EUR against USD, the path of GBP was more moderate, 
what is justifiable by its imbalances with the EU. Regarding CH (0.26) and SE (0.15) 
impacts, one plausible justification found was the exposure of the three countries to 
financial markets, expressed by market cap in percentage of GDP and market 
concentration. These results are more conclusive for CH than for SE (what is consistent 
with the magnitude of the coefficient), but a deeper analysis would be required to verify 
the accuracy of this argument. In addition, the indicator “Net Income from Abroad” 
provides similar results for the UK and CH before the crisis, since both countries 
present a positively high value, possibly meaning that both are subject to this flow to 
sustain their currencies’ value. Finally, the carry trade was also identified as a possible 
explanation, namely for CH coefficient since, until the Financial Crisis and quantitative 
easing policy, long position in GBP and short in CHF was a common strategy.  
South Korea presented in-sample evidence as being regressed by SE and EU before the 
crisis, and AU and SE during the crisis. The EU coefficient (-0.29) before the crisis 
might have similar justification to the UK. Indeed, the EUR had a significantly higher 
appreciation against the USD when comparing to the KRW. One of the potential 
explanations is the Korean’s strategy to redirect its exporter’s profile to China, through 
exchange rates and technological competitiveness policies. Thus, it is natural that the 
ceteris paribus effect from Euro is negative, having its weight in Korean’s main 
partners decreasing. The SE coefficient is strongly significant for both periods, so it is 
one of the most interesting results of this research. Given its irrelevant position in 
Korean’s Trade, I tried to find other connections between those countries. The focus of 
both economies in the  Technological Sector was found as the main common factor, so I 
included significant companies ‘stocks of both countries to explain KR, in a Linear 
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Model, to verify whether Technological companies were significant and they indeed 
replace the significance of SE. The results are quite interesting when it comes to 
Swedish companies, but only during the crisis, with Ericsson (Swedish technological 
company) being significant at a 10% significance level. However, they do not explain 
the significance of SEK on KRW returns since the SE coefficient remained with the 
same value. The AU coefficient during the crisis was the most difficult to explain, and 
no sustained argumentation was found.  
Finally, I would joint Australia and New Zealand in the same conclusion given its 
natural connection, the similar results and its exposure to the same factors. The Euro 
Zone impact on both countries, during the crisis period, was supported by two distinct 
facts. On the one hand, EU have represented a significant proportion of International 
Trade for both economies (over 10%) and its dimension in the global economy is 
unquestionable. On the other, carry trade may have influenced this strong relationship 
since Australia and, in slighter evidence, New Zealand, were presented as having been 
an attractive investment, while EU, given its low funding cost, would be used in a short-
position.  
As occurred in Rapach, Strauss and Guofu (2013), US was identified as the main 
returns’ driver. The same evidence, even slighter, was found in EU coefficient, being 
significant in both periods for more than one country. 
6.3) Drawbacks: As mentioned since the beginning, the purpose of this research is to 
find in-sample evidence that some exchange rates have been significantly explained by 
others. Obviously this procedure requires the inclusion of more variables, to guarantee 
that exchange rates’ significance, as regressors, is not a consequence of hidden 
information. That was attained through the inclusion of its own lags, yield variables 
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(level and term), carry variable and global equity index. Nevertheless, these control 
variables might not have been the most accurate, given the variety of forces that 
influence exchange rates. In some cases, this is due to the frequency used; in others, to 
dispersion from the main goal of the research. In the same way, this procedure does not 
test for out-of-sample accuracy, since it would require the construction of a complete 
forecast model, and that is not in accordance with the aim of this research. 
The approach focused on one-lag relationship, in spite of some exceptions to control for 
autocorrelation, representing a “reaction” of one week. Considering the high liquidity 
and turnover in the Forex market, the information is expected to process more quickly 
than in other markets, so this frequency might be considered as appropriate. Even 
though I control this possibility in some cases, I might have ignored significant 
coefficients with longer horizon. 
Finally, the in-sample evidence may have been influenced by the period considered, 
which has been affected by abnormal events, such as the Financial Crisis or the sharp 
depreciation of the USD. For the former, I have adjusted the procedure by considering 
two periods (before and during crisis). The coefficients might have been biased by other 
events that were not considered in the model and the crisis beginning is difficult to 
define, so the results might be distinct under other assumptions. Regarding the latter, I 
could have considered other currency-basis that could present a more stable pattern. 
6.4) Future research: The previous drawbacks identified in the research are a good 
starting point to suggest future research. Accordingly, other periods could be used, other 
variables included and other events to justify the results. In addition, the results’ 
accuracy will only be truly tested when considered in complete model. The out-of-
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sample test is crucial to compare with the existing models and verify whether some 
exchange rates, such as EUR/USD or SEK/USD, can be considered as predictors.  
Despite the innovation in modelling, other events, which have been identified during 
this research, might assume a great preponderance in exchange rate path in the future. 
The most evident case is China, in what concerns to South Korea, but it can be extended 
to other countries that have experienced an increasing influence of China in its 
economies. This is also dependent on the exchange rate regime adopted by this 
economic giant (nowadays it is fixed).  
Another procedure was introduced in this research, concerning the impact of Swedish 
companies’ stocks on Korean’s exchange rates. The main intuition was the similarities 
in main industries (in this case, it was the technological), but there are several other 
approaches that can lead to interesting results.  
Finally, extensive literature suggest the application of other type of models besides the 
ones used in this research. Suarez and Lopez (2008) indicate that nonlinearity of 
exchange rates might be the cause of failure of most forecast models. Teräsvirta (1994) 
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